Intercontinental Identity: The Right to the Identity in the Louisiana Civil Code by Broyles, Patrick N.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 65 | Number 2
Winter 2005
Intercontinental Identity: The Right to the Identity
in the Louisiana Civil Code
Patrick N. Broyles
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Patrick N. Broyles, Intercontinental Identity: The Right to the Identity in the Louisiana Civil Code, 65 La. L. Rev. (2005)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol65/iss2/7
Intercontinental Identity: The Right to the Identity
in the Louisiana Civil Code
INTRODUCTION
If Boudreaux, an energetic entrepreneur, snapped a picture of
Thibodeaux, a renowned shrimper, and put Thibodeaux's picture on
a billboard advertising Boudreaux's shrimp boil, could Thibodeaux
recover against Boudreaux for the commercial value of his visage?
If this were to have occurred in California, where right of publicity
cases appear commonplace, the answer is a resounding "yes." Of
course, one might be hard pressed to locate a single Boudreaux or
Thibodeaux living in sunny California.1 In Louisiana, however,
where both surnames fill the telephone directories,2 our legal question
enjoys particular significance. But when Louisiana becomes the situs
of the misdeed, the seemingly facile common law answer becomes
muddied by a cloud of civilian theory and court silence on the issue.
To a common law scholar, the question of whether Louisiana
would recognize a right of publicity would, in fact, appear easy; after
all, at least twenty-eight states currently honor, via statute, common
law, or both, a person's right to recover pecuniary damages for the
unwanted commercial use of his identity.3 If so many other states
recognize the right of publicity, then why would not Louisiana?
Indeed, with the question posed in this fashion, the answer could
prove just as trite: a Louisiana judge simply could hitch a ride on the
coattails of common law jurisprudence and create an analogical
commercial right to one's identity.
Fortunately, no Louisiana judge has yet to borrow the sister states'
right of publicity, for to employ only the rough-fitting instrument of
common law analogy to fashion so peculiar and intricate a right
would be to crudely circumvent Louisiana's civilian legal tradition.
But then again, to approach the question of whether Louisiana law
recognizes a right of publicity from within the civil law presents
much more difficulty than does simply borrowing the right from the
common law. Thus, what seemingly would have been a simple
Copyright 2005, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. According to a Yahoo! People Search, there are eight Boudreauxs and six
Thibodeauxs currently residing in Los Angeles, a city of nearly 3.7 million people
according to the 2000 census. See Yahoo People Search, at
http://phone.people.yahoo.com; United States Census Bureau, American
FactFinder, at http://factfinder.census.gov.
2. A Yahoo! People Search located 200 Boudreauxs and 118 Thibodeauxs in
Houma, Louisiana, a city of 32,393, according to the 2000 census. See Yahoo
People Search, supra note 1; United States Census Bureau, supra note 1.
3. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy §§ 6.3, 6.8
(2d ed. 2002).
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answer of common law analogy now demands a daunting journey into
civilian juridical relations, French legal tradition, and the jurisprudence
of the Continental right of privacy.
4
Without doubt, Louisiana's legal system supports identity rights of
some sort. The right of appropriation privacy, the personal,
extrapatrimonial counterpart to the commercial right of publicity, has
been recognized by Louisiana courts (albeit in common law fashion),
and more significantly such a right finds support both in Louisiana's
civilian legal tradition and even the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.6
The question, then, is not simply whether identity rights have a place
in Louisiana law, but rather what is the nature of Louisiana identity
rights. Specifically, this paper attempts to tackle this difficult question:
does Louisiana law support apatrimonial right to the identity, that right
commonly referred to as the right of publicity?
Part I of this paper provides the reader with an understanding of
what many states commonly refer to as the right of publicity, and how
this right complements the personal right of appropriation privacy.
This section discusses the tumultuous history of identity rights as they
have come to be in the United States, first as a right of privacy and then
later as both appropriation privacy and the right of publicity,7 and
provides a brief exemplar of current American identity rights
jurisprudence.
Part II turns to civilian France, where courts have faced their own
plight with patrimonial and extrapatrimonial identity rights.
Examining the evolution of identity rights in French law and
jurisprudence demonstrates the perplexing theoretical difficulties of
what some courts have hinted to be a seemingly dual extrapatrimonial
and patrimonial identity. Indeed, while a patrimonial right to the
identity has been accepted in civilian France, the reasons for doing so,
while always grounded in law, appear based more in rough practicality
than in finely woven legal theory, thereby revealing the tension between
traditional civilian taxonomy and common commercial practice.
4. Much of this paper's discussion of the Continental right of privacy occurs
in the context of France. The reasons for this are two-fold: first, Louisiana law
owes much of its content to France's Civil Code and the doctrinal works of French
jurists; secondly, the French right of privacy is a near verbatim reproduction of the
European Union's right of privacy. Compare C. civ. art. 9 (France) with European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8 (1950).
5. See generally A. N. Yiannopoulos, Property § 17, in 2 Louisiana Civil law
Treatise (4th ed. 2001).
6. See La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
7. Courts and scholars universally accredit Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), with giving birth to the "right of
publicity." See, e.g., Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 130 n.14 (1993).
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Part 111 turns to identity rights as they exist under the European
Union through article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the very article that gave rise to France's
modem right to respect for private life.8 While the identity rights
jurisprudence in the European Court of Justice and the European Court
of Human Rights is far from prevalent, there nevertheless exists a strong
argument that such courts would award both non-pecuniary and
pecuniary damages for the misappropriation of one's identity.
Part IV closes with the right to the identity under Louisiana law. The
same theoretical difficulties that have plagued the Continental
commercial right in the image loom over a Louisiana right to the
commercial value of one's identity, for Louisiana's legal tradition, like
that of civilian France, long has viewed one's personal connection with
the identity as an extrapatrimonial "personality right" incapable of
pecuniary valuation.9 However, also like France, Louisiana has a
codified right of privacy"0 and a general tort provision," each of which,
at least in theory, could supply an independent legal basis for recovering
both non-pecuniary, moral damages, andpecuniary commercial damages
for a violation of one's right to be secure in his image. A few cases
involving a personal, private right in one's image have passed through
Louisiana courts, 2 though not one Louisiana appellate court has seen a
plaintiff assert a right to the commercial value of his identity.
Nevertheless, Louisiana law indeed does support a patrimonial right
to the identity. Though understanding the right requires a rethinking of
real right taxonomy, the right nevertheless exists rather neatly within the
traditional civilian classification system, living in harmony not only with
Louisiana's legal tradition, but with the body of Louisiana's Civil Code.
I. THE DIVERGENCE OF PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Early Developments and the Initial Separation of the Rights
The American notion of protecting an interest in one's identity first
arose in the pivotal article penned by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
8. See Charles de Haas, France, in International Privacy, Publicity &
Personality Laws 133, § 11.06 (Michael Henry ed., 2001).
9. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, at §§ 17, 201; Jeanne M. Hauch,
Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren and Brandeis Tort is Alive and
Flourishing in Paris, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1219, 1228-29 (1994); Elisabeth Logeais &
Jean-Baptiste Schroeder, The French Right of Image: An Ambiguous Concept
Protecting the Human Persona, 18 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 511, 513 (1998).
10. See La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
11. See La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
12. See infra Part IV(A).
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in the winter of 1890, entitled, "The Right to Privacy."' 3 While the
authors were primarily concerned with preventing the public disclosure
of embarrassing private facts,'4 the carefully crafted language of the
authors nevertheless extended the canopy of privacy over one's image. "
Twelve years later, the New York Court of Appeals in Robertson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co. quelled any initial hopes in a common law
privacy right. 16 The ensuing public outrage in the decision prompted the
New York legislature to enact the following year17 laws imposing
criminal 8 and civil' 9 liability for the unauthorized use of a person's
identity for "advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade." 0 These
early statutes remain largely unchanged and serve as fitting examples of
the then current perception of identity as a fundamental aspect of
privacy.E" Three years after the1902 New York Court of Appeals
rejected a common law right to privacy, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Pavesich v. New EnglandLife Insurance Co. welcomed the right in what
scholars have lauded as "the leading case" embracing the right of
privacy.22 Like Roberson, Pavesich also dealt with a claim of the
unauthorized appropriation of the plaintiff's image, only this time the
defendant used the plaintiff's likeness in conjunction with a falsified
quote of endorsement.23 In a thorough opinion, Judge Cobb came to
13. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890). See McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:10-11 (2d ed. 2002).
14. See McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:11.
15. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 13, at 213 ("The principle which
protects personal writings and any other productions of the intellect ... is the right
to privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends this
protection to the personal appearance...."). But see William L. Prosser, Privacy,
48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 401 (1960) ("There is little indication that Warren and
Brandeis intended to direct their article at... the exploitation of attributes of the
plaintiff's identity.").
16. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The case
actually dealt with a plaintiff complaining of the misappropriation of her
photograph in flour advertisements, though it was the broad notion of a common
law privacy right that vexed the court.
17. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:16.
18. N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (Consol. 2002).
19. Id. § 51.
20. McCarthy, supra note 3, at § 1:16.
21. These statutes provide the sole remedy for a plaintiffwhose image has been
appropriated. New York has no common law right of publicity. See Stephano v.
News Group Pub., Inc., 485 N.Y.S. 2d 220, 223-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
Current New York Civil Rights Law section 51 mimics Prosser's appropriation
privacy tort in that it awards damages for personal affront and commercial valuation
of the image. Id.
22. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See
McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:17 n. 1.
23. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 81. The advertisement contained photographs of two
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recognize the right of privacy as a natural law derivative whose
tortious violation affords general damages for one's "wounded
feelings. 24
For the next half century, courts couched identity rights in terms
of "privacy." But this blind adherence to only a private, personal
perspective of image left those with particularly recognizable
identities without remedy. Celebrities whose images had been
wrongly appropriated for marketing purposes usually would sue under
their rights of privacy.25 Butjudges were unable to comprehend how
public figures who normally seek the limelight could have their
feelings hurt by additional publicity, especially when the publicity
was favorable. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., exemplifies this
conundrum. 26 The plaintiff in O'Brien was a famous football player
whose picture appeared in a football calendar produced by Pabst Blue
Ribbon Beer. He sued the beer distributor under his right of privacy,
but the majority rejected this claim because the plaintiff was a
celebrity. The publicity he had received from the calender was "only
that which he had been constantly seeking and receiving. ' ' 27 Because
O'Brien did not sue for the market value of his image, the majority
refused to reward such damages.2 8 In short, the courts simply could
not look past the "privacy" label of the right. Then in 1953, two
companies went to court to settle, of all things, a contract dispute-and
the right of publicity was born.29
The contract in Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.
licensed to the plaintiff the exclusive right to use a certain baseball
men, the plaintiff and another, to illustrate the "have and have not" effects of
purchasing life insurance. Pavesich's image was the happy man who evidently had
made the wise purchase, as his headline read, "Do it now. The man who did."
Below the plaintiff's picture was a lengthy testimonial highlighting his delight in
defendant's insurance. Pavesich, of course, had no life insurance with the
defendant, and never made the statements quoted in the ad. McCarthy, supra note
3, § 1:17.
24. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 73.
25. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:25.
26. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941).
27. Id. at 170.
28. Id. There was, however, a strong and perceptive dissent. Judge Holmes
viewed the plaintiff's right to use his image for advertising purposes as a property
right, and pointed to the current market practice of advertisers paying for the right
to use a celebrity's image as proof. Holmes noted that the plaintiff should not have
been required to plead the correct law. Id. Rather, because the plaintiff alleged
facts that constituted a misappropriation of his image, the dissent wisely concluded
that he should have been entitled to collect the fair market value of the use of his
image. Id. at 171. The dissent was concerned that the majority's decision posed the
danger of leaving celebrity plaintiffs without a remedy for non-libelous, marketing
uses of their images. Id.
29. Haelan Labs, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.
1953).
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player's photograph on a trading card to aid in the sale of the
company's gum. The defendant, Topps Chewing Gum, knew of the
contract but concluded that it served only as a release of the plaintiff s
liability for using the baseball player's image in violation of his
statutory right of privacy. Subsequently, Topps approached the
baseball player and convinced him to sign a similar contract with
them.3"
Judge Frank disagreed with Topps's interpretation of the contract.
Viewing the player's image from a market perspective, Judge Frank
concluded that player's photograph had actual "publicity value,"
especially when combined with an exclusive grant ofuse. He found the
assignment of the player's right to market his image to be a valid
transaction, and further opined that "[t]his right might be called a 'right
of publicity. "'31 With those few words arose another right to the
identity, only this time the right appeared rooted in commerce and
sounding in property rather than personality. This was, and in essence
remains, the right of publicity.
1. The Right of Publicity Versus Appropriation Privacy
If Haelan Labs provided the spark for the right of publicity, then
Melville Nimmer fanned the fire. Only one year after Judge Jerome
Frank coined the phrase "right of publicity," Nimmer wrote his article
calling for a separate property right in the image.32 Nimmer focused in
large part on the right of privacy's inability to protect against the
pecuniary value of the identity. Cases such as O'Brien v. Pabst Sales
Co. exemplified the seeming oxymoron of the privacy-seeking
celebrity.3" More importantly, because the right of privacy was a
personal right that protected against offense to the psyche, the action
appeared incapable of securing damages for the commercial value of
one's image. Nimmer argued that the inadequacies of privacy and
other rights such as unfair competition dictated the very essence of the
right of publicity.35 In short, the right of publicity was to be the
antithesis of privacy. Whereas the right of privacy was a personal right
that guarded against hurt feelings, the right of privacy was a property
right that measured damages according to the value of the publicity
appropriated by the defendant." However, only six years after Nimmer
30. Id. at 867.
31. Id. at 868.
32. Melville B. Nimner, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp. Probs.
203 (1954).
33. Id. at 205, 220-21.
34. Id. at 208.
35. Id. at 216.
36. Id.
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called for a separate right of publicity, William Prosser sought to unite
identity rights under the label of privacy.
In 1960, Dean William Prosser of the University of California
School of Law, Berkeley, wrote one of the most influential works in
American law, an article rather unassumingly entitled "Privacy."37 In
it, Prosser divided invasion of privacy into four separate torts: (1)
physical intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude; (2) public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3)
presenting the plaintiff in a "false light;" and (4) appropriation of
some identifiable aspect of the plaintiff's identity for the defendant's
advantage. 38 The last of these torts was destined for trouble. Up to
this point, sixty years of case law and commentary had agreed that the
right to privacy was inherently personal and protected only one's
emotional well-being. But Prosser felt that the market value of one's
identity could enjoy like protection under his last privacy tort.39 Even
though he recognized both the personal and the market perspective of
image, Prosser nevertheless chose to protect both interests under the
rubric of "privacy." Thus, according to Prosser and the Restatements
soon to follow, plaintiffs seeking commercial damages for the
appropriation of their images would be wise to proceed under the
"appropriation privacy" label.40 However, many courts simply could
not see past privacy as the protectorate of the personality. As a result,
when any publically-renowned plaintiff asserting a commercial
interest in her identity mentioned the word "privacy," many courts
continued to balk at the idea despite Prosser's urging.4 As for the
courts that, unlike Prosser, differentiated appropriation privacy from
the right of publicity according to possible damages, seeking
proprietary damages under the right of privacy proved to have most
unfavorable consequences.42
37. Prosser, supra note 15.
38. See generally Prosser, supra note 15. Prosser's four privacy torts were
subsequently incorporated into the 1977 Second Restatement of Torts and have
been universally accepted by American courts. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:24.
39. Prosser was aware of the proprietary nature of the image, he accepted its
assignability, and moreover, he agreed with Judge Frank's decision in Haelan Labs.
See Prosser, supra note 15, at 406-07.
40. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:24.
41. Id. § 1:26.
42. See, e.g., Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 503-09 (Ga. App. 1966).
The plaintiff in Cabaniss, an exotic dancer alleging a violation of her right of
privacy, sought damages for her mental anguish and her tainted name and
reputation caused by the wrongful appropriation of her photograph. The court
found, however, that while the plaintiff alleged a right of privacy violation, she
actually was suing for the commercial appropriation of her image, which allows for
special, proprietary damages only upon a showing of the commercial value of the
appropriated image. Because the plaintiff failed to make such a showing, the lower
court's favorable ruling was reversed. Id.
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2. The Current State ofAmerican Identity Rights
After Prosser's article, American law was poised to make a
choice. It could either protect both personal and commercial interests
under Prosserian "appropriation privacy" or assign to the personal and
commercial perspectives of identity totally separate rights with
distinct "privacy" and "publicity" labels, as was proposed by Haelan
Labs and Nimmer. Not without problems,43 the separatist view has
43. See, e.g., PETA v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995). Bobby Berosini,
an orangutan trainer, was repeatedly and unknowingly filmed by People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals, or PETA, as he prepared his animals for their
performance. The resultant video showed Berosini "slapping, punching and
shaking" the apes while assistants held them down, and it also showed Berosini
beating the animals with a baton. Id. at 1272-73. The graphic nature of the video
made for a powerful marketing tool, so PETA used the film to promote general
publicity and fund-raising campaigns. Id. at 1284. Berosini sought damages for
libel and appropriation privacy and was awarded $4.2 million by the trial court.
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed. The libel claims were correctly dismissed
because the events shown on the film were true. The court's dismissal of the
identity appropriation claim, however, hinged on Berosini's pleading. Id.
In his brief, Berosini had grounded his claim "within the common law tort
of misappropriation of one's name or likeness." Id. The court concluded that
Berosini meant by this phrase to assert his right of appropriation privacy in his
image. Then it distinguished appropriation privacy from the right of publicity as
follows:
The distinction between these two torts is the interest each seeks to
protect. The appropriation tort seeks to protect an individual's personal
interest in privacy; the personal injury is measured in terms of the mental
anguish that results from the appropriation of an ordinary individual's
identity. The right to publicity seeks to protect the property interest that
a celebrity has in his or her name; the injury is not to personal privacy, it
is the economic loss a celebrity suffers when someone else interferes with
the property interest that he or she has in his or her name. We consider it
critical in deciding this case that recognition be given to the difference
between the personal, injured-feelings quality involved in the
appropriation privacy tort and the property, commercial value quality
involved in the right ofpublicity tort.
Id. at 1283 (emphasis added).
The court found the distinction critical and called for a full reversal. Berosini
sought and proved damages for PETA's substantial pecuniary gain attributable to
the use of his image-damages that flow from the right of publicity. But Berosini
asserted an action for appropriation privacy, which only allows recovery for hurt
feelings, and the case was dismissed. Id. at 1284-85. However, the court ignored
one crucial fact: on a basic level, Berosini simply complained that PETA had
misappropriated his image for commercial gain, a wrongdoing that gives rise to
personal and proprietary damages. But by pedantically equating "the common law
tort of misappropriation of one's name or likeness" with appropriation privacy, a
claim that permits only personal damages, the court was able to ignore Berosini's
clear request in his brief for the recovery of "the pecuniary gain sought by PETA
through the use of [his] name and likeness." Id. at 1284.
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prevailed. 44 As a result of the slow-moving, seemingly uncontrollable
legal evolution from Pavesich through Haelan Labs and beyond, both
"privacy" and "publicity" labels have become ingrained in the
common law of the states that lay witness to this evolution. Today,
a majority of courts see appropriation privacy and the right of
publicity as divergent rights protecting different interests in the
image. According to this majority separatist view, appropriation
privacy is invaded by an injury to the psyche, whereas the right of
publicity is invaded by an injury to the pocketbook.46
Perhaps not surprisingly, the overwhelming majority of case law
addressing the right of publicity concerns the appropriated identity of
a celebrity.47 Because celebrities' identities typically carry significant
commercial value, the appropriation of a celebrity's identity
oftentimes will result in substantial lost profits and/or property
damage suffered by the owner of the identity. 48 But the fact that
celebrities assert their right to publicity more often than the average
person does not mean that only celebrities possess the right. Rather,
44. McCarthy, supra, note 3, §§ 1:31 et seq., §§ 5:61-65.
45. See, e.g., Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1995)
("[T]he right of publicity differs substantially from the right to privacy. The policy
underlying... invasion of privacy is the protection... ofprivate personae from the
mental distress that accompanies undesired publicity. . . . The right to publicity
protects pecuniary, not emotional interests."); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2000) (addressing the difference between
the right of privacy and the right of publicity, the court stated: "What may have
originated as a concern for the right to be left alone has become a tool to control the
commercial use and, thus, protect the economic value of one's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness"); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, No. ED 78785, 2002
WL 1610972, *6 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.) (citing McCarthy, supra note 3, § 5.61)
(concluding that appropriation privacy and the right of publicity differ "only in their
justifications and the types of damages awarded"); see also McCarthy, supra note
3, § 5.61 ("While much judicial confusion has been expressed over the years as to
the difference between the right of publicity and the appropriation form of the right
of privacy, the dimensions of the difference are today fairly well spelled out by
many courts and commentators.").
46. McCarthy, supra note 3, § 5:61.
47. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir.
2001) (actor Dustin Hoffman sued under his right of publicity for the use of his face
as it appeared in the movie Tootsie); Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th
Cir. 1997) (actors George Wendt and John Ratzenberger, "Norm" and "Cliff" of
Cheers sit-com fame, sued the defendant restaurant owner's use of animatronic
robots resembling the Cheers characters); Henley v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (Don Henley, the celebrated drummer for the
Eagles, sued defendant for the use of the phrase "This is Don's henley" in print
advertisements promoting henley shirts); Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc.,
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1995) (Joe Montana, former superstar
quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers, sued the defendant newspaper for the use
of his photograph in a promotional poster); see McCarthy, supra note 3, § 4:2.
48. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
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the right is available to all, as it is the "inherent right of every human
being to control the commercial use of his or her identity."49 Indeed,
every person's image has the potential for commercial value
regardless of the uses to which the person puts the image. ° The
potential is realized once the identity is used in commerce.5 Every
person's image gains some market value from the moment it is
appropriated, for if the user of the image had not taken the identity,
he would have had to bargain for it. In short, every commercially
used image has, at the very least, a replacement value. 2
49. Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 590 (N.D. Tex. 1999). The view of the right of
publicity as a sui generis property right enjoyed by all is most readily reflected in
the statutes of a select group of states. California, Florida, and Virginia make no
mention of either privacy or publicity and instead opt for the holistic approach by
simply making a tortfeasor liable for any damages resulting from the unauthorized
use of one's image. See Ca. Civ. Code §§ 3344-3344.1 (West 2002); Fla. Stat. ch.
540.08 (2002); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-8.40 (Michie 2002). More importantly,
though, each statute attributes to the identity right a definite proprietary attribute.
Virginia's law provides for a limited twenty-year postmortem right to the image,
while California and Florida provide for the outright transferability and heritability
of the right. See Ca. Civ. Code § 3344.1 (West 2002); Fla. Stat. ch. 540.08 (2002).
50. Indeed, celebrity status often is a chance occurrence befallen to the average
person. Monica Lewinsky led a very uncelebrated life prior to her relationship with
President Clinton. Now she is a household name with an autobiography and a
clothing line.
51. See KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d
Dist. 2000) (noting that even though the appropriated images did not belong to
celebrities, the plaintiff nevertheless had a cause of action because California Civil
Code section 3344, California's appropriation statute, did not limit itself to celebrity
plaintiffs and allowed for minimum damages for this very reason); Motschenbacher
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.II (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added):
Generally, the greater the fame or notoriety of the identity appropriated,
the greater will be the extent of the economic injury suffered. However,
it is quite possible that the appropriation of the identity of a celebrity may
induce humiliation, embarrassment and mental distress, while the
appropriation of the identity of a relatively unknown person may result in
economic injury or may itself create economic value in what was
previously valueless.
52. A similar view was adopted by the court in Ainsworth v. Century Supply
Co., 693 N.E.2d 510, 514-15 (I11. App. Ct. 1998). Stock photography companies
exemplify this notion. The people portrayed in the photos often are no more famous
than you or me. Nevertheless, the unique qualities of these images convey some
sort of message, be it as trite as happiness. An advertiser selecting a photo from the
image bank seeks out the identity that best embodies the message it wishes to
convey. In such instances, the message, and not celebrity status, attributes value to
the image. A stock photo costs anywhere from $50 for a royalty-free image up to
thousands for a licensed image. See, e.g., Getty Images, at
http://creative.gettyimages.com/ (last visited May 1,2005). Thus, the appropriated
image of the average person, at the very least, would carry a comparable price tag.
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Thus, the American identity right has two faces: the Jekyllian
right of appropriation privacy and the Hydian commercial, seemingly
proprietary right of publicity. Exactly what form the commercial
right takes ultimately varies from state to state and jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Some states such as New York53 award commercial
damages for the appropriation of one's identity 4 but do not recognize
the transferability or heritability of the right.55 At the other end of the
spectrum are states like California which view the right of publicity
much like any other property right, fully transferable, assignable, and
heritable.
Perhaps in the common law, the creation of such a sui generis
right is as easy as enacting a law. But in the civil law, where the
identity and the extrapatrimonial rights attached to it traditionally
have been kept wholly separate from patrimonial real rights and credit
rights,56 the ideas of recognizing an aspect of the identity worthy of
pecuniary valuation and perhaps even subject to transfer seems, at
first glance, wholly violative of the very fabric of the civilian
classification system. Nevertheless, such a right has emerged on the
European continent.
II. IDENTITY RIGHTS IN CIVILIAN FRANCE
A. The Civilian Understanding of Personality Rights
The modem French droit 1 'image (the right on the image), what
has become a complex, sui generis right with patrimonial and
extrapatrimonial aspects, finds its roots deeply embedded in
personality rights, and in particular, the right of privacy.57 But before
any discussion can be had of civilian identity rights, the reader first
must have an understanding of the civil law's taxonomy of rights
(those "interests secured and protected by law").58  Private,
substantive rights first are divided into patrimonial and
extrapatrimonial rights. This initial division primarily looks at the
purpose served by the particular right and indirectly refers to the
53. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (Consol. 2002).
54. See Stephano v. News Group Pub., Inc., 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 223-25 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
55. See Smith v. Long Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, 499 N.Y.S.2d
167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
56. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, §§ 17, 201.
57. See Hauch, supra note 9, at 1228-29 (1993); Logeais & Schroeder, supra
note 9, at 513.
58. See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System: Louisiana and Comparative
Law § 228 (2d ed. 1999).
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object the right seeks to protect.59 Patrimonial rights generally attach
to things (here, "things" are broadly defined as material objects or
intangibles that generally are subject to appropriation") and,
consequently, are subject to pecuniary evaluation and form part of a
person's patrimony.' Also, patrimonial rights ordinarily are
transferable and heritable.62 Patrimonial rights are further divided
into real rights and personal rights, a dividing line that falls between
63the laws of property and obligation. Thus, a real right is a right that
a person has directly over a thing, while a personal right is a right that
a person has over some performance or duty owed by another.'
Extrapatrimonial rights, by contrast, form a residual category of
rights incapable of pecuniary valuation or appropriation by another.65
Such rights do not attach to "things," since "things" in the traditional
civilian model are subject to appropriation.66 In essence, these rights
are moral in character, and commonly involve rights of the family
(such as the right of a child to receive support and education from the
parents,67 or the mutual duty of fidelity, support, and assistance owed
by each spouse to the other 8) or rights of the personality. Within this
latter category of extrapatrimonial lies the initial focus of this paper.
According to traditional civilian doctrine, "personality rights"
seek to protect those aspects of the person inseparable from the
personality.69 Because of their essential connection to the human
psyche, such personality rights do not attach to "things" and,
consequently, are neither subject to appropriation nor pecuniary
evaluation, thus placing them wholly outside of commerce.7 ° One's
name, likeness, liberty, personal integrity, status, and honor are
examples of such rights of the personality. Indeed, each takes part
59. Id.
60. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, § 12. Apparently, included within
Yiannopoulos' broad definition of things are the objects of obligations.
61. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 58, §§ 164-65 ("Under Louisiana and
French law, a patrimony is a coherent mass of existing or potential rights and
liabilities attached to a person for the satisfaction of his economic needs. Every
person has a patrimony ... [I]n principle, the patrimony is nontransferable by
inter vivos act.")
62. See id. § 229.
63. See Yiannopoulis, supra note 60 at § 201.
64. Id.
65. See Yiannopoulis, supra note 58 at § 229.
66. See id. § 12.
67. See La. Civ. Code art. 227 (2004).
68. See id art. 98.
69. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, § 17.
70. See id. §§ 12, 201.
71. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 58, § 229; Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, §§
12, 201; Marcel Planiol, 1 Traitd Elmentaire de Droit Civil, nos. 433-46, 278-80
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in forming the very fabric of the identity. Thus, according to the
traditional civilian classification scheme, the identity-as incidents
of the collective personality-is an inherently extrapatrimonial object
giving rise to various personality rights. Once such personality right
is the right to privacy, which eventually emerged from French
jurisprudence as the primary protectorate of the identity.72 But with
the rise of commercial advertising, French courts have had to rethink
their understanding of the extrapatrimonial identity and its guardian
privacy.
B. Sources of Law for French Identity Rights
To be sure, French citizens enjoy certain rights over their
identities. As already discussed, such rights exist in their
fundamental form within the basic understanding of extrapatrimonial
personality rights. However, while the classification system of
juridical relations forms the framework of the civil law, it is not law
in and of itself. In civil law jurisdictions, the authoritative sources of
law are legislation and custom. 73 French courts principally have
looked to two Civil Code articles as the source of identity rights:
Code Civil articles 1382 and 9.74 Article 1382 states: "Any act
whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by
(Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 12th ed. 1939). Yiannopolous also places
"products of the intellect" under the protection of the rights of personality, though
such protection is vastly different from intellectual property rights such as
trademark and copyright. Yiannopolous is referring to the moral rights an author
has in the integrity of her work, as such rights are extrapatrimonial and incapable
of alienation. See Eric Lauvaux, France: Moral Rights as Obstacles to the
Exploitation of Musical Works, in Moral Rights: Reports presented at the meeting
of the International Association of Entertainment Lawyers MIDEM 1995 Cannes
72 (Cees van Rij, ed., Chris Wilde, trans., 1995); Laurence Goldgrab, France, in
Moral Rights: Reports presented at the meeting of the International Association of
Entertainment Lawyers MIDEM 1995 Cannes 82 (Cees van Rij, ed. and trans.,
1995).
72. Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 9, at 513.
73. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 58, § 84; La. Civ. Code art. 1 (2004). The
French Civil Code contains no provisions corresponding to Louisiana's article 1;
according to Yiannopoulos, French legal scholars thought of the sources of law as
a matter of legal science not requiring definition by the Legislature. See
Yiannopoulos, supra note 58, § 84. However, in regards to the hierarchy of
legislation, French legislation consists of the "block of constitutional norms;"
treaties duly ratified" and European Union law; the lois (laws) of Parliament,
rbglements (administrative texts) of the executive government, and ordonnances
drafted by the executive and not opposed by Parliament; and the Civil Code. John
Bell, Sophie Boyron, & Simon Whittaker, Principles of French Law 15-25 (1998).
74. See infra Part II(B)(2).
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whose fault it occurred, to compensate it."75 Article 9, enacted in
1970,76 provides:
Everyone has the right to respect for his private life.
Without prejudice to compensation for injury suffered, the
court may prescribe any measures, such as sequestration,
seizure and others, appropriate to prevent or put an end to an
invasion of personal privacy; in case of emergency those
measures may be provided for by interim order.
Of course, other less prevalent statutes 78 also touch on the identity,
but articles 1382 and 9 of the French Civil Code have proven to be
the primary sources of law for French identity rights.7 9
C. The Origin of Identity Rights: The Right of Privacy in The
Rachel Affaire
Many scholars suggest that the French right of privacy originated
as a jurisprudential creation, but such a sweeping statement is
misleading. 0 In the sense that no such code article explicitly
75. C. civ. art. 1382 (France) (as translated by France's official legal web site,
Legifrance, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr).
76. French Civil Code article 9 was passed in Act no. 70-643 of July 17, 1970
and reiterates the substance of article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights of 1950, which was already directly applicable in France in 1970. See de
Haas, supra note 8, "France" § 11.06. The article came in response to a decision
by the Cour de Cassation in the Gerard Philippe affair to uphold a preliminary
injunction ordering the removal of all pictures of the plaintiff's ill son in seeming
defiance of article 51 of the Press Law, which limited seizures for defamation to all
but four copies of the defamatory article. Hauch, supra note 9, at 1239-42.
77. C. civ. art. 9 (France) (as translated by France's official legal web site,
Legifrance, at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr).
78. See, e.g., Intellectual Prop. Code arts. L. 121-1, 711-4, & 713-6 (France).
79. Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the precursor to French Civil Code article 9, also protects a right to the
identity. See infra note 91; European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 8 (1950):
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise
of this right except as such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,
public safety or the economic well-being ofthe country, for the prevention
of disorder of crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
80. See, e.g., Bell, Boyron, &Whittaker, supra note 73, at 367. Scholars often
refer to the French right of privacy as a purely court-made rule. See, e.g., Hauch,
supra note 9, at 1231 ("The development of privacy rights in France was a
836 [Vol. 65
COMMENTS
provided for protection of privacy 100 years ago, the courts indeed
were responsible for finding a way to protect one's private life. But
even then, courts based their protection of privacy upon an
application of existing law. Thus, while a sense of the French "right
of privacy" may have found its name in the jurisprudence, the early
French identity right, insofar as it stemmed from Code Civil article
1382, existed a priori. Such was the case in The Rachel Affaire,8 l
which marks France's earliest protection of the right of privacy.
The Rachel Affaire involved the unauthorized use of a person's
identity. Rachel, a famous early nineteenth century actress, was
photographed on her deathbed with the permission of her sister, who
wanted the photographs to serve as a remembrance. The
photographer was directed to not disclose the pictures to the public.
Nevertheless, shortly after Rachel's death, sketches of the actress's
deathbed scene began to appear for sale in local shops. The sister
subsequently sued the photographer and the artist. The court found
for the plaintiff under Code Civil article 1382 but curiously called the
plaintiffs right to oppose such actions "absolute," which seemed to
shirk any requirement of proving the defendant's fault.82 Perhaps
even more astounding was the court's order for the seizure and
destruction of the sketches and the photographs upon which they were
based." Nevertheless, the application of article 1382 and the
remarkably 'uncivil' process in the sense that, without benefit of any legislative
guidance on the subject, French judges essentially created the right to oppose the
publication of private facts."). However, this label is exaggerated, for the early
courts nevertheless found privacy protection within the tort principles of article
1382 ofthe Code Civil, the continental counterpart to Louisiana's Civil Code article
2315. While the early courts' application of article 1382 arguably may have been
over-extended, the civilian tradition nevertheless allows judges to interpret and
apply legislation.
81. T.P.I. de la Seine, June 16, 1858, D.P. III 1858, 62.
82. Id.; see also Hauch, supra note 9, at 1233-34; Logeais & Schroeder, supra
note 9, at 514. This type of strict liability application of article 1382 to a violation
of one's right on the image has drawn criticism from scholars. A French
commentator describes the problem as twofold:
a) Simple reproduction without authorization sufficed to found the action
for reparation, even if the victim did not prove the "fault" of the author of
the "delict." In fact, when one invokes article 1382 it is generally
necessary to prove fault. Here, this fault is constituted by the objective
fact of the violation of the right of the person on his image; there is no
need to prove the bad faith of the photographer ....
b) When one founds one's action on article 1382 of the Civil Code, one is
required to prove the prejudice for which one demands reparation. Here,
it suffices to prove the assault on the right of personality: this moral
damage is thought to be realized ipso facto by this assault, so that the
victim does not need to prove it ....
Pierre Frdmond, Droit de la Photographie-Droit Sur L'Image 345 (3d ed. 1985).
83. Hauch, supra note 9, at 1233.
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preference for specific relief over money damages would come to
establish a trend in courts's dealing with privacy rights for the next
century.8 4
D. From Privacy to Patrimony: The Droit ci L 'Image
For the 100 years following Rachel, French courts looked to
article 1382 as the protectorate of the private identity, though courts
often invoked the article without questioning the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct or whether the conduct was objectively
offensive. 85 This movement toward an apparently "absolute" right of
privacy came to a head in a decision by the Cour de Cassation in the
Gerard Philippe Affaire,86 where the Court permitted the right of
privacy to preempt other, more specific legislation. In seeming
defiance of article 51 of the Press Law, France's high court upheld a
preliminary injunction ordering the removal of all pictures of the
plaintiffs ill son, even though Article 51 limited seizures for
defamation to just four copies of the defamatory article.87 Shortly
after the decision in the Gerard Philippe Affaire, France's legislature
enacted article 988 of the French Civil Code, which in effect created
a broad-based, near-absolute right of privacy.89 Though couched in
terms of "privacy," article 9, together with article 1382, would rise
to the forefront as guardians of both extrapatrimonial and patrimonial
interests in the identity.9"
84. Id. at 1233-34.
85. Id. at 1234-35. See generally de Haas, supra note 8, § 11.05.
86. Judgment of July 12, 1966, Cass. civ. 2e, 1967 D.S. Jur. 181 (Fr.).
87. Id.; see also Hauch, supra note 9, at 1239-42.
88. See supra note 76.
89. Hauch, supra note 9, at 1243-44. The right cannot be said to be wholly
absolute. While the plaintiff need not prove the fault of the defendant under article
9, the defendant is not without a defense. Consent, and more importantly, article
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which establishes a freedom of
speech and information, may justify the defendant's dissemination of private
information about the plaintiff. See Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 9, at 521-31.
90. As is discussed more fully in Part III, the law of the European Union
likewise recognizes a right of identity through article 6 of the Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), which incorporates article 8 of the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"):
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The
Court has already held that elements such as gender identification, name,
sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of the personal
sphere protected by Article 8 [of the ECHR]. The Article also protects a
right to identity and personal development, and the right to establish and
develop relationships with other human beings and the outside world and
it may include activities of a professional or business nature.
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Of course, Civil Code article 1382 asserts no limits as to the type
of injury, or the extent of damages, it protects, and while the language
of Civil Code article 9 certainly recognizes the need for compensating
one's injuries,9' the article nevertheless speaks only of protecting
one's "private life," a historically personal and extrapatrimonial right.
In this sense, article 9 reaffirms what was always protected by article
1382-a right to one's identity-without having imposed any
additional, more stringent extrapatrimonial limitations to the right.
Indeed, any argument that the identity should remain solely as an
extrapatrimonial aspect of the personality does not find support in the
language of articles 1382 and 9, but from tradition's understanding of
the right. Thus, if a patrimonial right to the identity is to flourish in
the civil law, it is not the law, but the civilian taxonomic system, and
the notion of the identity, that requires some rethinking. As will be
seen, the strict, historical understanding of the identity is not
incorrect; rather, it is incomplete.
In the later half of the twentieth century, French courts began
compensating plaintiffs not only for the emotional harm suffered by
the defendant's affront to the plaintiff's private life, but for any
resultant economic damage as well. In doing so, the courts relied
upon article 1382 and article 9. Some scholars refer to this
jurisprudential shift from recognizing the identity as a pure
personality right to the acceptance of some sort of patrimonial aspect
in the image as the move from a "right to one's image" to a "right on
one's image. ' '92 Regardless of the label one assigns to the
phenomenon, the recognition of a pecuniary interest in the identity
marks only a theoretical shift, for the codal provisions applied by the
courts-articles 1382 and 9-remained unchanged during this
renaissance. Still, what might appear at first glance to have been the
fabrication by the courts of an entirely new right, this author suggests
it was nothing more than a jurisprudential epiphany to an a priori
right always protected by article 1382, a right which, until the age of
commercialization and advertising, simply was not known.
Perhaps the earliest jurisprudential recognition of the patrimonial
identity came in 1955. The plaintiff, Marlene Dietrich, sued a weekly
Peck v. United Kingdom, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2003). Unfortunately,
right of identity jurisprudence under either article 6 of the TEU or article
8 of the ECHR is not nearly as prevalent as is that of the French courts
applying article 9 and article 1382 of the French Civil Code, though there
is a strong argument for extending the rationale of the French droit 6
l'image to article 8 of the ECHR.
See infra Part IV.A.
91. Article 9 permits courts to issue injunctions "[w]ithout prejudice to
compensation for injury suffered." C. civ. art. 9 (France).
92. See Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 9, at 516-17.
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tabloid magazine for publishing a series of articles containing certain
sentences set out in quotation marks which gave readers the false
impression that Dietrich actually had stated these private details
regarding her sexual and family life. 3 When the case came to the
Cour d'appel de Paris, Dietrich sought additional damages beyond
what the lower court had given for her emotional suffering. The Cour
d'appel agreed with the plaintiff and awarded her 1.2 million francs
in pecuniary damages, evidently compensating Dietrich for her lost
business opportunity to publish memoirs she was in the process of
preparing when the defendant's articles were published.94
Certainly the violation in Dietrich is distinguishable from the
American right of publicity; after all, Dietrich dealt with the
dissemination of facts, rather than the commercial appropriation of
one's name or likeness. The significance of Dietrich lies in the scope
of the compensation awarded by the court. Rather than having
viewed the plaintiff's unwritten stories as a purely extrapatrimonial
aspect of the personality, the court in Dietrich recognized that the
plaintiffs past life occurrences, even in an unpublished, incorporeal
form, had commercial value. In the sense that one's past makes up
the individual, Dietrich's unwritten life story indeed was nothing
more than a collective embodiment of her identity. Nevertheless, in
the face of civilian legal tradition and the extrapatrimonial identity,
the court found Dietrich's life story-her identity-to be capable of
pecuniary valuation.
Similarly, in a 1970 case, author Henri Charri~re sued a publisher
for producing a book about his life and for using his photograph on
the cover.95 The plaintiff sought damages for the violation of his right
of privacy and for the unauthorized use of his photograph. The court
rejected Charri~re's privacy argument, as the book made use only of
public documents and the photograph was taken in a public place.
93. Judgment of Mar. 16, 1955, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1955 D.S. Jur. 295
(Fr.). See also Hauch, supra note 9, at 1237-38. In fact, the details contained in
the articles were true, but the court stressed the fact that the details were published
without the consent of the plaintiff. Id. This approach by the court has led scholars
to attribute to this opinion a finding of an absolute right of privacy despite the
general tort principles of Civil Code article 1382. Id. While this may be true, the
importance of Dietrich for this paper is the court's awarding of both non-pecuniary
and pecuniary damages for the defendant's dissemination of private facts about the
plaintiff.
94. Judgment of Mar. 16, 1955, Cour d'appel de Paris, 1955 D.S. Jur. 295
(Fr.).
95. T.G.I. Paris, Feb. 27, 1970, Gaz. Pal. 1970, 1,jurispr., 353, note Sarraute.
See also Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on
the Right to One's Image, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 673, 684 (2002).
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Nevertheless, the court recognized that the author's photograph had
commercial value when used in such an instance.96
Also of significance is the 1987 case of actor Alain Delon.97
Delon sued a tabloid magazine for publishing a story containing a
photograph of him after he had undergone surgery in a Cuban
hospital. Delon based his claim upon article 1382 and his article 9
right of privacy, yet he sought both moral damages and damages for
the unauthorized use of his image for commercial purposes. The
lower court rejected Delon's claim for commercial damages,
reasoning that the nature of his claim did not permit such damages.
The Cour de Cassation reversed, holding that article 9 alone permits
courts to repair the entirety of the plaintiffs damage suffered as a
result of an affront to his private life.98 The significance of this case
is two-fold. First, the Court reiterated earlier jurisprudence
recognizing a pecuniary interest in one's image. Second, and perhaps
more significant, France's highest court seemed to have
acknowledged the possibility of collecting pecuniary damages within
the rubric of article 9 privacy. Still even more significant
developments in the droit cV /'image were soon to follow.
A year after Delon was decided, a court of first instance was faced
with a rather unique claim in Mme. Brun v. SA Expobat.99 The widow
of the famous French actor Raimu brought suit against an advertising
company that had used a caricature of her late husband to aid in the
sale of real estate.'00 While the court rejected the wife's claim for
moral damages for invasion of privacy, the court awarded the widow
damages for a share of the profits enjoyed by the defendant from the
use of her late husband's image. As was correctly summarized in the
reports:
The right to one's image has a moral and patrimonial
character,; the patrimonial right which allows the contracting
of the commercial exploitation of the image for monetary
compensation, is not purely personal and passes on to heirs.
For a great actor to achieve celebrity, far from allowing the
free use of his image for commercial purposes, makes it more
necessary on the contrary to obtain his consent which he may
deny for dignity reasons or grant subject to payment. In the
96. T.G.I. Paris, Feb. 27, 1970, Gaz. Pal. 1970, 1,jurispr., 353, note Sarraute.
97. Cass. le civ., Nov. 17, 1987, Bull. Civ. 1987 I, No. 301, 216, note M.
Delon. See also Reiter, supra note 96, at 684 (2002).
98. Cass. le civ., Nov. 17, 1987, Bull. Civ. 1987 I, No. 301, 216, note M.
Delon.
99. T.G.I. Aix en Provence, Nov. 24, 1988, J.C.P. ed. G. 1989, 11,21329, note
J. Henderycksen, affirmed, CA Aix en Provence, 2e ch., May 21, 1991, R.J.D.A.
8-9/91, 756.
100. Id. See also Logeais & Schroeder, supra note 9, at 537-38.
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present case, the use of an actor's image for advertising
purpose is not offensive; yet it was subject to his heirs'
authorization for she could have derived profit from such use
according to the law of demand on the advertising market.1'
Thus, not only did the court outrightly recognize a patrimonial aspect
of the identity, the court made the quantum leap towards
acknowledging the heritability of the right to the identity. In doing
so, the court seemed to suggest thatflowingfrom the extrapatrimonial
identity insusceptible of appropriation and outside of commerce is a
pecuniary, commercial right to the identity which is subject to
inheritance and, perhaps, appropriation and transfer.
Eight years later, the 1996 Cour d'appel case of Les Editions Sand
& M Pascuito v. M Kantor, Mme. Coluccil1°2 added to the Brun
understanding of the droit & l 'image. Les Editions Sand involved the
publication of photographs of a widow's late husband, the famous
French comedic actor, "Coluche." In upholding the decision of the
lower court finding for the widow, the Cour d'appel made this
statement regarding the droit ii l'image:
The right of image is apersonality right which entitles anyone
to oppose the dissemination and use of his or her image
without prior consent .. .. [T]he violation of this right may
cause to its holder moral damage and, as the case may be,
economic damage whenever the holder conferred a
commercial value to his or her image due to his or her
activities or notoriety ....
Whereas heirs may seek relief for the moral harm caused
by such violation only if the selection and display of the
image is likely to impair the perception that the public may
have of the deceased artist, they are entitled to full
compensation of the economic damage stemming from said
violation. 103
At first glance, the language from the Cour d'appel appears
paradoxical. The court outrightly called the right of image a
personality right, but nevertheless attributed to it the heritability
characteristics of a patrimonial real right. However, by reading Brun
and Les Editions Sand together, one realizes the soundness of the
101. Mine. Brun, T.G.I. Aix en Provence, Nov. 24, 1988, J.C.P. ed. G. 1989, 11,
21329, note J. Henderycksen (emphasis added).
102. CA Paris, Sep. 10, 1996, R.D.P.I. 1996, no. 68, 63. See also Logeais &
Schroeder, supra note 9, at 537-38.




courts' logic: the abstract identity, while insusceptible to
appropriation, nevertheless has very real patrimonial consequences,
and certain pecuniary rights may flow from what remains an
extrapatrimonial identity. Such a theory not only remains true to the
basic civilian notion of the extrapatrimonial identity, but finds
support in other areas of the civil law as well. 114 But absent from
Brun and Les Editions Sand was an explanation of how such a
pecuniary, patrimonial right to the identity comports within the
civilian classification of rights. Only by understanding the
classification of this right can one fully comprehend how the right to
the identity functions within the civil law, and in particular, the law
of Louisiana.' °5 But before turning to Louisiana law, the state of
identity rights in the European Union deserves a visit.
Ill. IDENTITY RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
With the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, or Treaty on European Union,
the European Union was born.0 6 Article F of the Maastricht Treaty
mandated as follows:
(1) The Union shall respect the national identities of its
Member States, whose systems of government are
founded on the principles of democracy.
(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and
as they result from the constitutional traditions
104. See infra Part V(D).
105. Id.
106. While the Maastricht Treaty marked a further step towards the unification
of Europe, the creation of the EU certainly was not the first step. Prior to the
creation of the EU, three European organizations had already begun the process
towards a unified Europe: the European Coal and Steel Community, the European
Atomic Energy Community and the European Community. In effect, the EU
embraces, rather than replaces, these three European communities. An often used
analogy of the EU structure is that of a roof with three pillars: the EU being the
roof, the European communities (the ECSC, the EAEC, and the EC) forming the
first pillar, common foreign and security policy as the second pillar, and
cooperation in justice and home affairs being the third pillar. See Klaus-Dieter
Borchardt, The ABC of Community Law available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/about/abc/index.html. By ratifying the Maastricht
Treaty, "Member States [ceded] some of their sovereign rights to the EC... and
have conferred on it powers to act independently. [Thus,] in exercising these
powers, the EC is able to issue sovereign acts which have the same force as laws in
individual States." Id.
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common to the Member States, as generalprinciples
of Community law.
(3) The Union shall provide itself with the means
necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its
policies."' 7
This sweeping call for a respect for fundamental rights has been
criticized for its failure to define the contents of these fundamental
rights, and their remedies, with more specificity." 8 Article F was
amended, however, by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam to become
Article 6 of the current Treaty on European Union ("TEU"). Though
the amendment did not provide a list of enumerated rights as some
commentators might have hoped, the Amsterdam Treaty did lend
more credence to Maastricht's original guarantee of fundamental
freedoms. As amended by Amsterdam, Article 6 of the Treaty on
European Union now reads as follows:
(1) The Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respectfor human rights andfundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are
common to the Member States.
(2) The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as
guaranteed by the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and
as they result from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, as general principles
of Community law.
(3) The Union shall respect the national identities of its
Member States.
(4) The Union shall provide itself with the means
necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its
policies.' °9
107. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. F, available at
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU-treaty.html (emphasis added).
108. See Tara C. Stever, Note: Protecting Human Rights in the European
Union: An Argument for Treaty Reform, 20 Fordham Int'l. L.J. 919, 960-61
(1997).
109. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, article 6 (2002),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/12002M/C_2002325EN.
000501.html (emphasis added). See also Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the




Thus, with the Amsterdam amendment, article 6(1) of the TEU
formally embraced human rights and fundamental freedoms as
founding principles of the European Union, principles "which are
common to the Member States." Though these fundamental rights
remain as general principles of law, they are law nonetheless. Of
singular import to this paper is, of course, the right to one's identity.
While no such right is outrightly specified in either the TEU or the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), the right
nevertheless exists, much as in France, as a jurisprudential blossom
of the statutory right of privacy.
A. The Fundamental Right to Privacy and the Identity
One of the "fundamental rights" guaranteed by the TEU lies in
article 8 of the ECHR, labeled "Right to respect for family and private
life." In particular, article 8 of the ECHR provides in pertinent part
that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his family and private life,
his home and his correspondence."'1 0 While the article makes no
mention of the identity, the European Court of Human Rights.11 has
interpreted this article as a protectorate of the identity. Insofar as the
European Court of Justice, when faced with an issue of fundamental
rights, must turn to the ECHR as directed by article 6(2) of the TEU,
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights often
becomes very persuasive authority in the application of the ECHR. 112
Thus, for purposes of examining the possible scope of the right of
privacy under EU law, the findings of the European Court of Human
Rights prove essential.
Perhaps the best recent example of ECHR jurisprudence finding
a right to the identity is Peck v. United Kingdom, as the facts of the
case likely would give rise to a cause of action under the United
States right of publicity." 3 In August of 1995, Geoffrey Peck was
suffering from a particularly severe bout of depression. Late in the
110. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, April 11, 1950, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
Convention/webConvenENG.pdf.
111. Limited searches of the European Court of Justice's jurisprudence did not
uncover a case either adopting or denying a right to the identity. Nevertheless,
insofar as the ECJ, when faced with an issue of fundamental rights, must turn to the
ECHR as directed by article 6(2) of the TEU, the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights proves to be very persuasive authority in the application of
the ECHR.
112. See, e.g., K.B. v. Nat'l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, Op. Adv. Gen. C-
117/01 (2003) (opinion by the advocate general examining ECHRjurisprudence in
the interpretation of article 8 ECHR to aid in a determination of whether
transsexuals had a right to marry).
113. 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 41 (2003).
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evening, Peck walked to the central junction in his town and cut his
wrists with a kitchen knife. Afterwards, he leaned over a railing,
watched the traffic pass before him, and waited to die. However,
Peck survived because the operator of a closed-circuit television
("CCTV") system installed by the city observed Peck wielding a knife
and dispatched emergency personnel to the scene." 4
During the months following the incident, video footage of Peck's
suicide attempt circulated from news stations to television programs,
and still images of the incident appeared in newspapers and other
publications. Peck filed suit in the European Court of Human Rights
against the various media commissions of the United Kingdom for
authorizing the release of the CCTV video. Peck's cause of action
was grounded in article 8 of the ECHR, the right to respect for his
private life.l1 5
In its assessment of the right to private life guaranteed by article
8 ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights noted the expanse of
the right, a right that included the right to the identity:
Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive
definition. The Court has already held that elements such as
gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life
are important elements of the personal sphere protected by
Art. 8. The Article also protects a right to identity and
personal development, and the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings and the outside world
and it may include activities of a professional or business
nature. There is, therefore, a zone of interaction of a person
with others, even in a public context, which may fall within
the scope of "private life." 1
16
However, the court also considered that there are occasions when
people engage in activities which they reasonably should know may
be recorded or reported in a public manner. The question, then,
becomes whether the person's expectation of privacy is reasonable.117
In the eyes of the court, the claimant's expectation of privacy was just
that-reasonable. While Peck was on a public street, the fact that he
was there late at night, and that he was not there to participate in a
public event, was enough for the court to find that Peck enjoyed a
114. Id. 10-11.
115. Id. 48-52.
116. Id. 57 (citing P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, app. no. 44787/98, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 56 (2001)) (emphasis added).
117. Id. 58 (quoting P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, app. no. 44787/98, Eur.
Ct. H.R. 56 (2001)).
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privacy interest in his public suicide attempt." 8 Moreover, the court
rejected the government's defense that the city council's interference
with Peck's right by releasing the video footage was justified, as the
council neither sought Peck's consent nor took reasonable steps to
ensure that Peck's identity would be masked." 9 As compensation for
his non-pecuniary emotional distress, the court awarded Peck 11,800
euros; however, the court rejected the claimant's request for
pecuniary damages to reimburse his costs incurred in trying to stop
the display of the video.12
0
In looking at the court's reasoning in Peck, it reads much like a
typical United States claim for appropriation privacy. Still, Peck is
significant for acknowledging and protecting the link between the
claimant and his identity. Though the court only compensated the
non-pecuniary, emotional harm that flowed from the misappropriation
of Peck's suicide attempt, the court nevertheless unquestionably
recognized that the protection afforded by article 8 ECHR reached to
the identity. Notably absent from the court's opinion was an award
for the commercial value of Mr. Peck's image. Peck made no such
request. 121 Ironically, however, the court's denial of Peck's claim for
pecuniary damages for his expenses actually suggests that the court
was willing to recognize a pecuniary aspect to the identity. The court
denied Peck's pecuniary claim because the plaintiff simply failed to
prove the amount of his expenses. The court simply pointed out that
in circumstances where the claimant has not provided sufficient proof
of his damages, the court does not award pecuniary damages."' A
contrario, where the claimant does prove pecuniary damages for an
affront to his identity, such damages are permitted.
Certainly a case like Peck does not provide the level of insight
into the patrimonial identity like the French jurisprudence applying
French Civil Code article 9. Still, it must be remembered that the
same article 8 of the ECHR applied in Peck was the very article that
gave rise to France's article 9. 23 Peck did not reject the plaintiff's
claim for commercial damages for the use of his identity, since no
claim was made. But Peck also did not reject the notion of a
118. Id. 62.
119. Id. 77 85-86.
120. Id. 77117-122.
121. In this regard, the plaintiff missed a potentially valuable opportunity. His
video was shown on the BBC series "Crime Beat," a program with an average of
9.2 million viewers. Moreover, footage of the video was shown in the weeks prior
to the airing to advertise the episode. Id. at 77 20-21. No doubt, the BBC likely
made a substantial profit from the use of Mr. Peck's image. Peck may not have
been a celebrity, but sensational, gruesome footage of a dying, knife-wielding man
carries significant commercial value no matter the person in the picture.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 79.
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pecuniary aspect of the identity. Without doubt, some aspect of the
right to the identity exists in article 8 of the ECHR. Given France's
interpretation of the scope of the right of privacy, it is not difficult to
foresee a future ECHR or ECJ court following France's lead and
finding within article 8 of the ECHR, and article 6 of the TEU, a
pecuniary, patrimonial right to the identity. In the meantime, the
question of whether the EU recognizes any sort of right in the
identity, at least, appears to have been answered.
IV. THE LOUISIANA RIGHT TO THE IDENTITY
Protecting the personality is a familiar concept in the civil law,
and specifically, in Louisiana. 24 As used in this sense, however,
personality denotes a purely extrapatrimonial concept incapable of
alienation or appropriation.125  A person's pecuniary interest in
identity, on the other hand, has never been acknowledged by a
Louisiana court.126 One federal court applying Louisiana law hinted
at Louisiana's possible acceptance of such an idea, 127 while most
recently, the Federal Eastern District of Louisiana accepted the
premise that if proved, the plaintiffs would be able to recover under
Louisiana law the reasonable market value of the use of the plaintiffs'
identities. 28  Inexperience, however, is not synonymous with
rejection, and Louisiana's unfamiliarity with a pecuniary notion of
identity cannot be equated with a wholesale dismissal of the right.
Given the growth of the pecuniary right of publicity in
neighboring common law jurisdictions, it is not difficult to foresee
Louisiana acknowledging a like right. However, as a matter of
scholarly prudence, the adoption of any new right should not occur
without first understanding how the right works within the framework
of Louisiana law and the civilian taxonomy of rights. Courts in
civilian France have come to protect the pecuniary notion of identity,
though many commentators still cannot comfortably resolve the
conflicting patrimonial and extrapatrimonial perspectives of the
identity.' This paper hopes to dispel some of this confusion. A
pecuniary interest in identity does fit within the rigid taxonomy of
civilian juridical relations, and more importantly, with the workings
of Louisiana law. But no such right has been acknowledged by
124. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, §§ 17, 201, 203.
125. Id.
126. See infra Part V.A.
127. See Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La.
1992).
128. See Capdeboscq v. Francis, 2004 WL 1418392 (E.D. La. 2004).
129. See supra note 57.
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Louisiana courts. Before the right to the identity is to be explored, a
survey of the Louisiana jurisprudence is needed to aid in explaining
why the question of a pecuniary interest in the identity-the question
of this paper-has not already been answered.
A. Louisiana's Limited Experience with Identity Rights
Over the past 100 years, Louisiana has seen very few cases
involving the appropriation of a person's identity, and while the
Louisiana Supreme Court has adopted Prosser's four privacy torts,1
30
not one Louisiana state court has had the opportunity to address the
commercial aspect of identity. Like jurisdictions elsewhere in the
United States, Louisiana's protection of identity arose out of a
broader notion of privacy, which surfaced as early as 1811 in Denis
v. Leclerc.'3' The defendant in Denis acquired a private letter written
by the plaintiff and subsequently ran an advertisement in the local
paper inviting the general public to the defendant's house to view the
130. See Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979)
(citations in original):
The right of privacy embraces four different interests, each of which may
be invaded in a distinct fashion; Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975); Prosser, Law of Torts,
4th ed. (1971); Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif.L.Rev. 383 (1960); Restatement
Second of the Law of Torts (1959). One type of invasion takes the form
of the appropriation of an individual's name or likeness, for the use or
benefit of the defendant. While it is not necessary that the use or benefit
be commercial or pecuniary in nature, the mere fact that a newspaper is
published for sale does not constitute such use or benefit on the part of the
publisher. Another type of invasion occurs when the defendant
unreasonably intrudes upon the plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion.
Because the situation or activity which is intruded upon must be private,
an invasion does not occur when an individual makes a photograph of a
public sight which any one is free to see; Prosser, Law of Torts, 809. A
third type of invasion consists of publicity which unreasonably places the
plaintiff in a false light before the public. While the publicity need not be
defamatory in nature, but only objectionable to a reasonable person under
the circumstances, it must contain either falsity or fiction. A fourth type of
invasion is represented by unreasonable public disclosure ofembarrassing
private facts. With reference to this category, Prosser states that "[i]t
seems to be generally agreed that anything visible in a public place can be
recorded and given circulation by means of a photograph, to the same
extent as by a written description, since this amounts to nothing more than
giving publicity to what is already public and what anyone present would
be free to see." Law of Torts, 811. Similarly, the Restatement Second of
the Law of Torts indicates that "there is no liability for giving further
publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to the public eye."
Jaubert found the right of privacy to be protected by Louisiana Civil Code article
2315. Id. at 1388-89.
131. Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297 (La. 1811).
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letter. True to his word, the defendant shared the contents of the
letter with inquirers. 3 ' Though the court based its decision for the
plaintiff upon one's property right in a letter,'33 the strong, protective
language of the opinion is saturated with the underpinnings of
privacy. '34
Louisiana courts and commentators ascribe the first outright
jurisprudential reference to a "right of privacy" to the 1905 case of
Itzkovitch v. Whitaker.' Curiously enough, the case involved the
unwanted display of the plaintiff's image. The defendant, inspector
of police, exhibited the plaintiff's photograph in the rogues' gallery
as a testament to his "notoriously bad" character. 136 In response to the
plaintiffs request to enjoin the publication of his photograph, the
court stated:
We think that the publication of an innocent man's
photograph in the rogues' gallery gives rise to sufficient
grounds to sustain an injunction. There is a right in equity to
protect a person from such an invasion of private rights.
Every one who does not violate the law can insist upon being
let alone (the right of privacy). In such a case the right of
privacy is absolute.'37
The court's description of privacy as an absolute right in equity falls
in line with the traditional civilian understanding of personality
132. Id. at318.
133. In answering whether the letter was property, the court replied, "There is
nothing that a man may so emphatically call his own, or more incapable of being
mistaken, than his ideas thrown upon paper, his literary works." Id. at 299.
134. Concerning the contents of the letter, the court remarked:
The letter, it is insinuated, is not written on a scientific subject: it was
prepared for a lady to whom the plaintiff was paying his addresses and
relates only to the object he had in view. Be it so: we are then fairly to
presume it written in "mystery and confidence." Then the defendant could
not produce it to light WITHOUT CRIME.
HE has not alledged [sic], surely he has not enabled us to believe,
that he had any other view than to vex the plaintiff. Then his "CRIME
IS STILL GREATER: for he seeks to unveil the secret of a letter,
with the only design of doing an INJURY TO THE WRITER, who
thought he might open his heart, without apprehension of that being
revealed, which he was writing for a friend only, and which he wished
to remain "concealed from the rest of the world."
Id. at 312 (emphasis in original).
135. See Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 39 So. 499 (1905) (cited in
Hamilton v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 61, 64-65 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1955)).




rights; however, this may have been coincidental. Though the court
does not cite a source for this passage, the absolutist language also
closely resembles that of the court's common law contemporaries.138
Regardless of the source of the court's reasoning, the November,
1905, decision enjoys particular significance, as it marks one of the
earliest jurisprudential acceptances of a right of privacy in the United
States.' 9
While the identity has enjoyed increasing protection since
Itzkovitch, the protection has been limited to the extrapatrimonial
personality. This limited protection, however, cannot be attributed to
the discretion of the courts; rather, plaintiffs seem reluctant to assert
a pecuniary interest in their identities. 4 ' In the 1968 decision of
Lambert v. Dow Chem. Co., the plaintiff sued his employer for
displaying graphic photographs of his work-related injury in plant
safety seminars.14 ' Even though such photographs carry commercial
value,'42 the plaintiff only claimed embarrassment and humiliation for
the violation of his right of privacy.'43 A more recent example of a
potential pecuniary interest in identity came in Slocum v. Sears
Roebuck & Co.'44 The plaintiff took her three and a half month old
daughter to Sears to have her photograph taken. Evidently impressed
by the child's photogenic attributes, Sears displayed the pictures in
sundry locations throughout two of its stores.14' The plaintiff sued
under Prosser's four privacy torts as had been adopted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc.
146
138. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 78 (Ga.
1905).
139. Courts and scholars typically view Pavesich as the case that lead the
development of the right of privacy. See McCarthy, supra note 3, § 1:17.
140. See McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1stCir. 1961) (plaintiff
recovered for an invasion of his right of privacy for the defendant's use of "before
and after" photos of the plaintiff to promote the defendant's health club); Easter
Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 530 So. 2d 643 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988)
(plaintiffs unsuccessfully sued for false light invasion ofprivacy and defamation for
the use in an adult film of unremarkable footage of them at a street parade); Sharrif
v. ABC, 613 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993) (plaintiffs asserted without avail
Jaubert's four privacy torts for the use of a video played on "America's Funniest
Home Videos" that depicted plaintiffs's band performing while the stage suddenly
collapsed).
141. Lambert v. Dow Chem. Co., 215 So. 2d 673-74 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
142. The commercial value ofthe images lies in the price a company would have
to pay to obtain and use such photographs. Barring misappropriation of the images
or the obtaining of a waiver by the person whose identity is represented in the
photographs, the company would be forced to pay for the photographs.
143. Id.
144. Slocum v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 542 So. 2d 777 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989).
145. Id. at 778.
146. Id. (citing Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La.
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The Court agreed that the actions of the defendant constituted a
technical interference with the child's privacy right, but found that
given the young age of the child, she was incapable of sustaining
actual damage." By focusing only on privacy, the plaintiffs missed
a golden opportunity. While the value of the photographs might not
have been that of a celebrity endorsement, the commercial worth of
the photographs nevertheless was made manifest by their use
throughout the stores. In short, the photographs of the child carried
a price because Sears chose to use them. Save for a waiver issued by
the parents of the child, Sears would have had to pay for the use of
these particular photographs. Moreover, the photographs may have
generated increased business for Sears, which in turn translates to
increased profits. As administrators of the child's estate, the parents
should have been able to recover either the usage price of the
photographs or a portion of Sears' profits generated by the
photographs. But the parents made no such claim.
B. Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co.:148 An Unremarkable
Prediction
In 1992, a Louisiana federal district court was called upon by
defendant Procter & Gamble to address a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff, world-renowned chef Paul Prudhomme,
sued P & G on multiple counts for the defendant's use of a Paul
Prudhonme look-alike in a Folgers Coffee commercial. One of the
claims Prudhomme asserted was an infringement of his "common
law" right of publicity.'49 P & G contended that Louisiana had not
recognized such a right and invoked Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal,
Inc. 5 o as proof that Louisiana identity rights were limited to Prosser's
four privacy torts. In response, Prudhomme pointed to common law
courts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts as proof that Louisiana
would recognize an analogous right of publicity. In response to both
parties' arguments, the court issued this plain statement:
While Louisiana courts have not explicitly adopted this right
[of publicity], they have not specifically precluded it, either.
Plaintiffs have made a good faith argument for extension of
the law in Louisiana on this topic, and should not be
1979)).
147. Id. at 779.
148. 800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992).
149. Id. at 395-96.
150. 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979).
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prevented from presenting an argument on this issue at this
early stage in the proceedings.'51
In short, the court merely recognized the silence of Louisiana courts
on the possibility of a pecuniary interest in the identity, though over
a decade later, Louisiana courts have yet to proceed any closer to-or
farther away from-recognizing such a right. Nevertheless, the
existence of such a right need not come from an extension by analogy
to the common law, which is exactly what the same federal court did
twelve years later.
C. The Latest Word on a Louisiana Right to the Identity.-
Capdeboscq v. Francis'52
In June of 2004, shortly before the printing of this paper, the
Federal Eastern District of Louisiana addressed plaintiffs' claims for
economic damages stemming from the use of their faces on the cover
of a video without their consent.'53 The plaintiffs did not outrightly
plead a violation of their right of publicity, but instead sought
economic damages for their misappropriation claim. '54 The court in
Capdeboscq followed the lead of Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal,
Inc. '55 and turned to the Restatement (Second) of Torts to aid in its
analysis of whether Louisiana would permit commercial damages for
the misappropriation of the identity. Unmoved by the fact that the
plaintiffs sought such economic loss for what was traditionally a
privacy-based tort, the Eastern District adopted the approach of the
Restatement'5 6 which allows for both emotional and commercial
damages for the violation of the right to the identity: "The court
concludes that if thePlaintiffs prove that Defendants misappropriated
their likeness, they would be entitled to emotional damages, as well
as reasonable market value of the use of the Plaintiffs' identity....",'
Though the plaintiffs were not celebrities, the court was at least
willing to entertain the idea of awarding the plaintiffs a "reasonable
royalty."' 58 However, no such award was issued, as the plaintiffs
evidently failed to meet their burden of proving the value of such a
royalty. 9
151. Id. at 396.
152. 2004 WL 1418392 (E.D. La. 2004).
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id. at*1 & n. 2.
155. 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979).
156. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652C, 652H (1977).
157. Capdeboscq, 2004 WL 1418392, *2 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in
original).
158. Id. at *3. See also infra Part I.C.
159. Capdeboscq, 2004 WL 1418392, *3.
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Without question, Capdeboscq comes closest to tackling the
question asked by this paper: does Louisiana law recognize a
pecuniary right in the identity? The court concluded that it did,
though the court rested its decision in right of privacy jurisprudence,
common law analogy, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This
author does not criticize the Eastern District in its analysis; the
opinion would have been dreadfully incomplete without such
reasoning. However, Capdeboscq did not address the more difficult
and fundamental (and admittedly academic) question ofjust how such
a right exists within the structure of the civil law. Capdeboscq was
correct in its holding. Louisiana law does recognize a pecuniary right
to the identity. But only by examining just how the right to the
identity exists within the civilian system may one fully understand
how the right functions under Louisiana law.
1. The Louisiana Right to the Identity
a. Sources ofLaw
Like France's article 1382, Louisiana too has an all-encompassing
tort provision embodied in Civil Code article 2315, which states in
part: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another
obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it." Also as with
France, Louisiana courts have applied article 2315 as the source of
law for the Louisiana right of privacy. 6 ' Curiously absent from
Louisiana's right of privacy jurisprudence, however, is Article 1, § 5
of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, entitled "Right to Privacy."
The article provides as follows:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful
purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely
affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the
appropriate court. 6'
160. See, e.g., Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388-89
(La. 1979).
161. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
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The Louisiana Supreme Court in Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal,
Inc.'62 distinguished this constitutional right of privacy from the
individual's private tort cause of action for an invasion of privacy:
The right to privacy under discussion here is one which
protects the individual against private action and is grounded
in tort. It should be distinguished from the constitutional right
to privacy which the United States Supreme Court, in a line
of cases, has found to emanate from certain provisions of the
Bill of Rights and to protect, from governmental invasion
only, those personal rights which are deemed fundamental or
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'63
However, the Louisiana Supreme Court went on to note that the
Constitutional Convention transcripts made no mention of limiting
the article to governmental intrusion.' 64 Moreover, in his article
entitled, "The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974," Professor Hargrave concluded that the notable absence of the
phrase "no law shall . . ." coupled with the placement of article 1,
section 5 outside of the sections dealing with procedural rights in
criminal cases meant that Louisiana's constitutional right of privacy
would protect a person both from state action and private action."
Unfortunately, Professor Hargrave's vision of Louisiana's
constitutional right of privacy has not come to fruition, as nearly
every case citing section 5 begins with "State v .... " However,
Hargrave's right of privacy has not been totally lost. At least one of
Prosser's four privacy torts has surfaced from time to time amid the
sea of "unreasonable search and seizure" defenses so common to
article 1, section 5. The right to be free from unwanted public
disclosure of private facts has found a place in Louisiana's
constitutional right of privacy, but even here, the claim usually arises
out of a government agency's refusal to disclose facts about
individuals.'66 Still, this does not mean that the right to the identity
cannot arise out of Louisiana's constitutional right of privacy. The
legal world's complacency in viewing section 5 as a right against
governmental intrusion alone does not dictate the scope of the right.
As has already been seen, the right of appropriation privacy has been
162. 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979).
163. Id. at 1387 n.1 (emphasis added).
164. Id.
165. Lee Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1 (1974).
166. See, e.g., Local 100, Serv. Employees' Intern. Union v. Forrest, 95-1954
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1996), 675 So.2d 1153 (union successfully sued the Louisiana
Department of Health and Hospitals for DHH's refusal to disclose a list of all state-
employed nurses' aids).
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recognized by Louisiana courts, albeit under Civil Code article 2315.
To recognize a right in the identity under the more specific Louisiana
Constitution article 1, section 5 would not be to fashion a new right,
but rather simply would be to acknowledge that the "right to be
secure in [one's] person" encompasses the civilian notion of the
person andthe rights that flow from the person: the extrapatrimonial
right to privacy and the patrimonial right to the identity.
Lastly, Civil Code article 2298 on enrichment without cause
appears peculiarly suited for situations when a claimant seeks
commercial damages for the defendant's use of the plaintiff's image.
Article 2298 provides as follows:
A person who has been enriched without cause at the expense
of another person is bound to compensate that person. The
term "without cause" is used in this context to exclude cases
in which the enrichment results from a valid juridical act or
the law. The remedy declared here is subsidiary and shall not
be available if the law provides another remedy for the
impoverishment or declares a contrary rule.
The amount of compensation due is measured by the
extent to which one has been enriched or the other has been
impoverished, whichever is less.
The extent of the enrichment or impoverishment is
measured as of the time the suit is brought or, according to the
circumstances, as of the time the judgment is rendered. 167
Louisiana Civil Code article 2298, upon a first reading, seems a
natural fit for the right to the identity, since it allows for the plaintiff's
recovery of either the defendant's profits from using the plaintiffs
image, or the cost that the defendant would have incurred in
contracting for the use of the plaintiffs image, whichever is less.
However, as it has been applied by Louisiana courts, article 2298
carries five requirements: (1) there must be an enrichment, (2) there
must be an impoverishment, (3) there must be a connection between
the enrichment and resulting impoverishment, (4) there must be an
absence of justification or cause for the enrichment and
impoverishment, and (5) there must be no other remedy at law
available to plaintiff1 6s This last factor appears to conflict with
article 2315. As has already been discussed, article 2315 is the
vehicle by which Louisiana plaintiffs have recovered for violations of
167. La. Civ. Code art. 2298.




their right of appropriation privacy."' However, since no Louisiana
cases have visited the pecuniary right to the identity, article 2315 has
not yet earned the role as the codal backer of the right to the identity.
Unless and until 2315 becomes the vehicle for recovery for the right
to the identity, article 2298 appears to be a strong contender for
Protectorate of the right, since at the time of the claim, there still
will have been "no other remedy at law available for the plaintiff."
b. Understanding the Right to the Identity Under Louisiana
Law
So what if Boudreaux puts a picture of the famous shrimper
Thibodeaux on a billboard endorsing Boudreaux's Shrimp Boil?
Earlier jurisprudence has already settled whether Thibodeaux can
recover for his emotional distress at having the driving world see his
picture on the side of the road. He can. The trouble is, a jury might
see such a thing as flattering, maybe even good for Thibodeaux's
business-and what if Boudreaux's new product is actually as good
as Boudreaux thinks it is? Thibodeaux would be even harder pressed
to prove that Boudreaux's misappropriation of his image actually
caused damage to his reputation and psyche. Indeed, some
commercial shrimpers might claw at the chance to get their name and
face in the public eye. If Thibodeaux ever wants to have a chance at
a substantial recovery, he needs to seek more than just damage to his
personality. He needs to recover for the commercial value of his
image. He needs to assert his pecuniary, patrimonial right in his
identity. But does such a right exist in Louisiana? It does.
In the very least, the patrimonial right to the identity exists under
Civil Code article 2315. Looking back to France, such a right has
found its place both in the general tort provision of French Civil Code
article 1382 and the more specific article 9 right to respect for private
life. Much the same, Louisiana has a general tort provision in Civil
Code article 2315 and a more specific right to be secure in one's
person in Louisiana Constitution article 1, section 5. Although article
1, section 5 is the more specific provision, and arguably the better
protectorate of the identity, the constitutional section's long-time link
to governmental intrusions makes 2315 the safer vehicle of the two
for seeking pecuniary damages for the misappropriation of the
identity. Of course, merely assigning a code article to the right to the
identity does not overcome the theoretical difficulties that come with
recognizing a patrimonial aspect of the traditionally extrapatrimonial
identity. Thus, the more difficult question in need of answering is not
whether such a right exists, but how such a right exists.
169. See infra Part V.A.
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c. The Identity as Property? No.
An immediately alluring answer is to classify the right to the
identity as a real right (or a property right), where the object of the
right is the identity itself. After all, if the identity is property, then its
misappropriation necessarily would give rise to damages. Moreover,
all the difficulties surrounding the transferability and heritability of
the right to the identity would vanish. In other words, this theory
would classify the identity as a thing, just like a car or a cat. Such a
theory indeed is attractive in its simpliciy, and some common law
jurisdictions have adopted this approach. ' But it cannot work in the
civilian system.
Classifying the identity as property cannot work, if for no other
reason, then because the identity is, and always has been, regarded as
an aspect of the personality incapable of alienation or appropriation.
Of course, some might suggest that this classification was wrong in
the beginning; certainly, eighteenth century jurists could not foresee
Michael Jordan's face in a Nike ad. 7' The jurists, however, were
correct: there is only one identity, and it cannot be alienated. Indeed,
the very thought of selling one's identity conjures visions of
Mississippi Delta bluesmen peddling souls at the Crossroads. But the
identity cannot be sold-not simply because it would be wrong to do
so, but because it is impossible to do so. One of the obligations of the
seller in a sale is to deliver the thing sold. 72 The identity, as it is
understood to be an inseparable aspect of the person, is incapable of
being delivered. Thus, in the sense that a "thing" is an object over
which may be conferred real rights, 73 the identity is no such thing.
Like it or not, the identity forever remains attached to the individual.
d The Solution: The Extrapatrimonial Identity and the
Patrimonial Right of the Identity
There is perhaps no better analogue to the identity than the
civilian notion of status, as it too is an extrapatrimonial, inalienable
aspect of the person.'74 Traditionally thought to comprise this right
170. See supra note 49.
171. A possible end run around this problem would be to recognize two
identities: the extrapatrimonial identity and the patrimonial identity, where only the
latter is subject to appropriation. However, this still does not solve the fundamental
requirement that a thing sold must be delivered. See supra note 163. The
approach, however, nears the solution. See infra Part V.D.2.
172. La. Civ. Code art. 2475.
173. See generally Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, § 12.
174. Planiol, supra note 71, nos. 433-46.
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is the nomen, "the fact of bearing the name which designates this
status;" the tractatus, "the fact of having always been treated as such
by all persons with whom family or business took place;" and the
fama, "the fact of having always been recognized as such by the
public."' 75 Not surprisingly, status bears directly upon filiation,'76 but
"status," as it is commonly understood by the public, goes well
beyond bearing the family name. Planiol writes that the "indications
[of status] given inferentially [in Code Civil article 32 1 ] should...
be extended to all kinds of statuses,"' 77 and he goes on to describe the
tripartite elements of"nomen, tractatus, andfama" as "nothing but a
mnemonic formula."'78 Indeed, status, when defined as the public's
view of oneself, is nothing more than another term for the identity,
one's external self. Viewed in this light, the identity, like status, is
not subject to commerce. 7 9 But most interestingly, Planiol rightly
recognizes that a sharp distinction must be drawn between one's
extrapatrimonial, inalienable status and the pecuniary, patrimonial
consequences that may flow from it.' Thus, while one's status as a
Jones is inalienable and extrapatrimonial, the right to succeed to the
fortunes of Granddaddy Jones is no doubt a pecuniary, patrimonial
right.
Extending Planiol's analysis of status apari to the modem notion
of the identity is both sound in theory and comfortable in application.
Few, if any, would disagree that one cannot outrightly sell his
identity, nor can one lose it by prescription. It is, indeed, an
inseparable part of the self. But then again, no person having ever
fallen prey to television, radio, print, or outdoor advertising can deny
that certain identities enjoy rather lucrative pecuniary rights flowing
from them. In this sense, what common law scholars refer to as the
right of publicity is nothing more than a patrimonial right of
commercial exploitation flowing from the extrapatrimonial self.
The idea of having a patrimonial, pecuniary right to the identity
is in no way contrary to traditional civilian doctrine. True, scholars
historically have labeled the identity as an aspect of the personality,
but the identity gives rise to more than just a personality right. On the
one hand there is the absolute, extrapatrimonial right to protect one's
identity from moral damage, and on the other, there exists the
pecuniary right to use one's identity for economic gain. In short, each
right protects different aspects of a singular identity. The
extrapatrimonial right protects the psychological union between the




179. See id no. 436.
180. Id. no. 437.
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individual and his identity, the individual's internal perspective of the
self, whereas the patrimonial right protects the commercial value of
the identity generated by a collective third-person, market perspective
of the individual's identity. Nevertheless, on a larger scale, both
rights arise out of one identity.
e. Classification of the Right to the Identity in Civilian
Taxonomy
Once the right to the identity is seen for what it is-a patrimonial
right to exploit one's identity for commercial gain-classification of
the right within the civilian taxonomy begins to take form. The right
to the identity is a real right insofar as (1) it entails ownership (the
right to use, enjoy, and dispose) 8' of a "thing," (2) it enables the
owner to draw from the thing all or part of its economic
advantages, 182 and (3) the right is opposable against the world. '83 But
what is the thing of the right to the identity? As has already been
determined, the object of the right cannot be the identity, since it is
incapable of appropriation. This is where the right to the identity
earns its sui generis badge. The object of the right to the identity is
not the identity, but rather the economic potential that stems from the
identity.
184
This unique understanding of a real right conferring ownership
over the commercial value of the identity is entirely sui generis, and
though the right to the identity bears resemblance to the right of
usufruct, unfortunately, the differences between the two rights are
significant enough to necessitate analogy beyond the law. 85 Imagine,
181. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, § 203.
182. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 58, § 232.
183. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 5, § 203.
184. Indeed, the notion that the value of a thing can serve as the object of a real
right is not completely foreign to the civil law. The accessory real right attaches to
the value of a thing, the value having been reserved to satisfy the claim of the
creditor. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 58, § 232. The most common example of
such a right is the mortgage, an accessory real right to the principle obligation to
pay the lender. Of course, the right to the identity is very different from an
accessory real right. There is no principle obligation, and more importantly, the
"thing" in which the creditor has a value interest itself is an object of ownership.
In other words, the object of the accessory real right (the value of the thing) is
wholly different from the object subject to ownership (the thing). But in the right
to the identity, the object subject to ownership is the value of the identity.
185. Perhaps the closest civilian concept to this notion of a right over the
"potential" of the identity is the right of usufruct over nonconsumables, a limited
real right conferring only the right of use and enjoyment over the thing. See La.
Civ.. Code arts. 539, 550 (2004). Like the holder of the right to the identity, the
usufructuary may use and enjoy the object of the usufruct, and also like the
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for a moment, the identity as a battery casing. Contained within the
battery casing is electricity, potential energy capable of powering an
array of items. In this sense, the commercial value of the identity can
be likened to the electricity contained within, but wholly separate
from, the battery casing. The economic value of the electricity of
course depends upon the size and charge the battery, much in the
same way that the economic value of one's identity depends upon
celebrity status and marketability. Thus, an exhausted battery is
nothing more than an empty shell, an identity without viable market
potential. But where the battery holds a charge, the owner of the
battery can sell to multiple parties varying amounts of electricity, and
he may do so without having alienated the battery.
In the same way, when an advertising agency contracts for the
limited right to use Michael Jordan's face on a billboard, the agency
has purchased only a small portion of the total market potential of
Jordan. Jordan retains the bulk of his identity's market value, and
more importantly, he retains his identity. Thus, the potential of the
identity, like the electricity within a battery, enjoys an existence and
significance separate from the identity itself. While the value of the
identity may be an object of commerce, the identity remains attached
to the person. When the value of the identity is exhausted, the
identity nevertheless remains.
Given this analogy, it is immediately apparent that the
commercial value of one's identity is an incorporeal movable:
incorporeal because it is intangible,' 86 and movable because it is not
immovable.'87 The right to the identity, then, is a patrimonial,
pecuniary right over the commercial value of one's image (an
incorporeal movable) that flows from the extrapatrimonial identity.
The right to the identity may be bought and sold in whole or in part,
leased, assigned, and encumbered just like any other object of a real
right. The right is governed by Books II and III of the Louisiana
inalienable identity, the object of the usufruct may not be alienated by the
usufructuary. The right of usufruct, on the other hand, is alienable much in the
same way that the right to the identity is alienable. See id. art. 567. In these
regards, the right to the identity bears notable similarities to the usufruct.
However, much ofthe laws ofusufruct address the relationship between the
usufructuary, the thing, and the naked owner, and the notion of the naked owner,
insofar as it places a limit on the rights of the usufructuary, simply does not comport
with the right to the identity. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the existence
of the naked owner on the usufruct (as it relates to the right to the identity) is that
the usufruct is not heritable and terminates upon the death of the usufructuary, see
id. art. 607, whereas the right to the identity is heritable and, to an extent, perpetual.
See infra Part IV.CA.
186. See id. art. 461.
187. See id. art. 475; see also id. art. 473.
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Civil Code to the extent that their provisions apply. In short, the
commercial potential of the identity is a thing.
f Transferability and Heritability of the Right to the Identity
Even after recognizing that the economic potential of the
identity is a thing separate from the extrapatrimonial identity, the
thought of a person selling to another his right to his identity,
thereby losing the right to decide when, where, and in what manner
his image will be used in advertising, still might seem a bit odd to
some. Nevertheless, it is a reality of the functioning market.
Advertisers routinely obtain exclusive rights to market an
individual. Of course, these rights are almost always limited in
duration and narrow in scope, but this is owed to wise contracting,
not to the confines of the law. Whether the transfer is for a limited
portion or for the whole of the value in the identity, nothing in the
law prohibits such a transfer.
The heritability of the right to the identity presents a different,
but related, difficulty. Nevertheless, public policy and legal theory
both counsel in favor of the heritability of the right. The difficulty,
of course, lies in the understanding of the attachment of the
commercial potential in the identity to the identity itself. Thus, the
question arises: if an individual dies and the extrapatrimonial
identity ceases to be, what becomes of the patrimonial value of the
identity? If one believes that the two can only co-exist, then the
pecuniary right in the identity necessarily would vanish upon death.
One word dispels this theory: Elvis. The reality of the market is
that some people are worth more dead than alive, and rather than
disappear, the market value of a deceased person's identity may
actually increase. This reality demonstrates that while the market
value of the identity initially relies upon the identity for genesis,
once created, the former can survive long after the latter.
Thus, the post-mortem existence of the marketable identity
presents two options: either the right, not being heritable, falls into
the public domain for all advertisers to feast upon; or the right,
being heritable, is passed either testate or intestate to persons close
to the decedent, people who,presumably, will show greater care and
concern in the manner in which they manage the market value of the
decedent's identity. Public policy suggests the latter option, as does
legal theory, for if the value of the identity, once owned by the
decedent, remains in existence after the death of the decedent, then





In today's world, advertising truly is everywhere. Television,
magazines, billboards, these have always been the traditional
medium. But now, as marketers continue to compete with their
creativity, it appears no surface is safe from the advertisement. The
backstop behind home plate at Wrigley Field, people's cars, even
the fold-down tray on an airplane all have been reduced to an
advertising medium. Advertising, like the mosquito, is a fact of
life. It may be ignored, but it cannot be denied.
Of course, behind all this advertising is money, a lot of money.
And when advertisers use human props for their ads, be they
celebrities endorsing a product or actors playing the role of
consumer, money moves from advertiser to individual. The
advertiser has paid for something. Services? Not really, since the
true value of the individual's work manifests itself over the life of
the advertisement. Rather, the reason the advertiser pays the price
is so that it may use the image of the individual. Most likely the use
is for a limited duration with very strict terms, thus creating a lease.
The object of this lease is the individual's commercial potential in
his identity.
Thus, with the reality of the advertising modus operandi comes
the reality of the right to the identity. In a sense, the right has been
born of necessity, as appeared to be the case in Haelan Labs, Inc. v.
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 188 when Judge Frank posited that the
celebrity suing for the misuse of his image cared not a bit about an
affront to his feelings-the celebrity plaintiff wanted money for the
marketer's use of his image. While common law jurisdictions have
reacted rather disparately in their treatment of this "right of
publicity," they at least have reacted by affording some level of
protection to plaintiff's seeking commercial compensation for the
misappropriation of their identities. Now it is Louisiana's turn.
True, existence of a civilian right to the identity requires some
rethinking of traditional civilian taxonomy. Namely, one must
accept that the commercial value of the extrapatrimonial identity
can be the object of ownership. But having made this hop, one
acquires a complete understanding of just how such a right is to
function within the civil law, and more importantly, within
Louisiana's Civil Code. Indeed, this is the beauty of the civil law.
Simply by understanding the classification of the right to the
identity as a real right over an incorporeal movable, the remainder
of the Civil Code takes over and breathes life into the right. The
188. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
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laws of delicts, obligations, matrimonial regimes, sales,
successions-all are fully equipped to handle the right in fair
fashion. Louisiana does have a right to the identity. The right has
always been under our noses, within the civil law and our Civil
Code, ready for action.
Patrick N. Broyles*
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